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Rosen: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SUMMARY

ZOBREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS
SCHOOL DISTRICT: SHOULD THE WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE COME
CRUMBLING DOWN? FUNDING SIGN
LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,t the Ninth
Circuit held that the school district's failure to provide a statepaid sign language interpreter to a handicapped student while
he .attended a sectarian school did not violate the First Amendment of the Constitution. 2 Specifically, the court held the school
district's conduct did not violate the Establishment Clauses or
the Free Exercise Clause. 4 With regard to the former the court
determined that the interpreter would have worked in a school
1. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.) (per Fletcher, J.;
with whom Reinhardt, J., joined; Tang, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992).
2. [d. at 1196-97.
3. The first amendment of the Constitution provides, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

85

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 10

86

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:85

environment in which two functions, secular education and advancement of religious values or beliefs, were intertwined. II With
regard to the latter, despite the burden on the student's free exercise of religion, the court found that a compelling state interest justified the denial of the requested interpreter. a
The Zobrest's petition for writ of certiorari before the
United States Supreme Court has been granted. 7

II. FACTS
James Zobrest is a student at Salpointe Catholic High
School. 8 Salpointe is a religious school that integrates religious
themes into the classroom. s
Zobrest is profoundly deaf, which qualifies him as a handicapped child under the Federal Education of the Handicapped
Act (EHA)10 and Arizona Rev. Statute § 15-761(6).11 Under both
the EHA 12 and the Arizona legislation, Zobrest is entitled to
have a sign language interpreter paid for by state funds. 1s The
5. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196.
6. [d. at 1196-97.
7. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
8. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). Salpointe Catholic High School is a private Roman Catholic school. [d. at 1192.
9. [d. The parties stipulated to these facts. Salpointe encourages its faculty to assist
students in experiencing how the presence of God is manifest in nature, human'history,
in the struggles for economic and political justice, and other secular areas of the curriculum. [d.
10. [d.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) which provides: "[T)he term 'handicapped
children' means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired,
visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other
health impaired children, or children with special learning disabilities, who by reason
thereof require special education and related services."
11. Arizona has a statutory scheme designed to meet the educational needs of handicapped students and to qualify it for federal assistance under EHA.
12. The bulk of EHA benefits are targeted for students enrolled in public schools.
Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192 n.l. When handicapped children are voluntarily enrolled in
private schools, the state does not need to pay their tuition. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a). However, the state and local school district must provide special education and related services to the private school children. 34 C.F.R. § 300.452(a).
13. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192. If James attended a public or non-religious private
school in Arizona, the school district would assume full financial responsibility for the
employment of a sign language interpreter, See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.13.
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Deputy· County Attorney informed the school district that because secular education and religious beliefs are intertwined at
Salpointe, a sign language interpreter would have to translate
religious precepts and beliefs.l4 Therefore, the Deputy County
Attorney argued, that furnishing an interpreter to translate religious beliefs would violate. both state and federal constitutional
prohibitions against state establishment of religion. 111 The Arizona Attorney General agreed with the Deputy County Attorney's opinion. 16
In August 1988, the Zobrests initiated a civil action under
the EHA seeking a mandatory injunction compelling the school
district to provide Zobrest with an interpreter. 17 The district
court denied the Zobrests' request for a preliminary injunction,18
but granted the school district's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the furnishing of a sign language interpreter would
in fact offend the First Amendment. 19

14. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192. The Deputy County Attorney of Pima County gave
this advice in the summer of 1988 before James Zobrest's enrollment which began in
August 1988. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) which provides:
Any State educational agency, any local educational agency,
and any intermediate educational unit which receives assistance ... shall establish and maintain procedures ... to assure
that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are
guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public education by such agencies and
units.
18. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1192. The court found the Zobrests had not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits, because the provision of an interpreter would likely
offend the first amendment's establishment clause. [d.
19. [d. at 1192-93. The district court noted the interpreter would act as a conduit
for the religious inculcation of James, thereby promoting James' religious development
at government expense. [d. That kind of entanglement of church and state is not allowed. [d. at 1193. Note that the district court agreed with the Pima County Deputy
Attorney and the Arizona Attorney General that the first amendment would be offended
by the furnishing of a sign language interpreter. [d. The court passed on the question of
whether the employment of a sign language interpreter would also violate the Arizona
Constitution. [d.
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

MAJORITY OPINION

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's summary
judgment de novo. 20 The court made the following determinations of fact: (1) to obtain federal funds through the EHA, a
state must offer free appropriate public education to all handicapped children within its jurisdiction;21 and (2) school districts
must provide services to handicapped students to meet their
special educational needs. 22
The Ninth Circuit held that the school district was not required to furnish Zobrest with an interpreter using state funds. 23
The court determined that providing Zobrest with a state
funded interpreter would violate the Establishment Clause. 24 In
addition, the court held that the school district's refusal to provide Zobrest with a state funded sign language interpreter at a
sectarian school did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 211
20. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). When the court reviews the summary judgment de novo,
the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there were genuine issues of material fact. [d. The court also reviewed
whether the district court applied the law correctly. [d.
21. [d. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1), which provides:
In order to qualify for assistance ... a State shall demonstrate
... that:
(1) the State ha~ in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public
education.
(2) The State has developed a plan ... [setting] forth in detail
the policies and procedures which the State will undertake in
order to assure that
(A) there is established a goal providing full educational opportunity to all handicapped children, a detailed timetable for
accomplishing such a goal, and a description of the kind and
number of facilities, personnel, and services necessary
throughout the State to meet such a goal.
22. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1193. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(A) which provides:
that, to the extent consistent with the number and location of
handicapped children in the State who are enrolled in private
elementary and secondary schools, provision is made for the
participation of such children in the program assisted or carried out ... by providing for such children special education
and related services.
23. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196.
24. [d.
25. [d. at 1197.
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The Establishment Clause

The United States Supreme Court has developed a three
part test to determine whether a statute is constitutional under
the Establishment Clause.1I6 A statute will be deemed constitutional if: (1) the statute has a secular legislative purpose;27 (2)
the statute's primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the statute does not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion. 28
The Ninth circuit held that the EHA and its Arizona counterpart legislation passed the first prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test. 29 The statute 30 at issue manifests a secular purpose. 31
Congress' intended secular purpose was to assure that a free, appropriate public education is available to all handicapped
children. 32
However, the court held that the proposed application of
the statute did not pass the second prong of this test because
the statute, in its application, would have a non-secular effect. ss
26. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).
27. The Supreme Court is reluctant to accuse the statute's writers of unconstitutional motives, when there is a feasible secular purpose on the face of the statute. [d. at
394-95.
28. [d. The three part test is called the Lemon u. Kurtzman test. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29. [d.
30. The Federal Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400 [hereinafter
EHA].
.
31. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1193.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1991) provides:
It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all children with
disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs; to assure that
the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or
guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all children with disabilities, and to
assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate children with disabilities.
The Arizona statute that is the counterpart to the EHA has a similar goal. Zobrest,
963 F.2d at 1193.
33. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1193-94. The Supreme Court generally evaluates the validity of a statute on its face. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 600 (1988). In this case the
court evaluated one specific proposed application of the statute because the statute is
extremely broad. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1194 n.3.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 10

90

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:85

The Ninth Circuit observed that an interpreter would be the instrumentality that conveys the religious message. 34 The presence
of a government employee in a sectarian class would create the
symbolic union of government and religion in a joint enterprise,
prohibited under the Establishment Clause. 31i Thus, using state
assistance to provide an interpreter for Zobrest was not secular
or separable. 36
The majority did not address the is'sue of whether the statute passed the third prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test.
2.

The Free Exercise Clause

The United States Supreme Court has held that when the
government forces an individual to elect between following or
abandoning their religious beliefs in order to receive state provided benefits, the government places a burden on the individual's free exercise of religion. 37 This burden, therefore, violates
the Free Exercise Clause unless justified by a compelling state
interest. 88
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit determined that the denial
of aid to Zobrest imposed a burden on his free exercise of religion. 89 The court reasoned that Zobrest would have to make a
choice. 40 He would either have to give up a sectarian education,
in order to receive aid to pay for an interpreter, or he would
have to pay for the interpreter himself while enrolled at
Salpointe. n
The Ninth Circuit further held that the state had a compelling interest in ensuring that the Establishment Clause is not
violated, and that this interest justified the burden on Zobrest's
free exercise of religion. 42 Thus, refusing to provide Zobrest with
34. [d; at 1194.
35. [d.

36. [d. at 1196.
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
38. [d. at 406.
39. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196.
40. [d.
41. [d.
42. [d. at 1196·97. The Ninth Circuit determined that there are no less restrictive
means by which the state can prevent the establishment clause from being violated. [d.
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a state paid interpreter while he is enrolled at a sectarian school
did not constitute a free exercise violation. 43
B.

DISSENTING OPINION

Judge Tang argued that furnishing Zobrest with a state
funded sign language interpreter while enrolled at Salpointe
does not violate the First Amendment's prohibition against the
establishment of religion." In addition, Judge Tang concluded
that the Free Exercise Clause was violated because there was no
compelling state interest justifying withholding funds for a sign
language interpreter.4!!
1.

The Establishment Clause

Judge Tang agreed with the majority that the EHA and the
Arizona counterpart legislation passed the first prong of the
Lemon v. Kurtzman test. 46 He also observed that although a
state funded sign language interpreter would benefit religion or
religious exercise, a secular purpose could still be' found. 47 Furthermore, he reasoned that cultivating talents and skills in
handicapped children and removing barriers to achieving full academic potential are valid secular interests."6 Judge Tang thus
concluded that neither the EHA nor the Arizona counterpart
legislation's purpose was to endorse or promote religion."9
However, Judge Tang disagreed with the majority's holding
that the EHA and the Arizona counterpart legislation did not
pass the second prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test. He reasoned that, through their interpretation of precedent,!!O the majority had elevated form over substance at the expense of handi43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 1204.
[d.
[d.; see also Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servo for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,

485-86 (1986); Mueller V. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983); Hunt V. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973).
48. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1198.
49. [d.
50. [d. "The majority raises the specter of a symbolic union of church and state, and
dismisses as inapplicable cases in which similar general educational welfare programs
have passed constitutional muster." [d.
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capped children:n Specifically, Judge Tang asserted that the
is.sue was whether the program as a whole had the proscribed
primaryG2 effect of advancing religion, GS rather than the majority's focus on the specific use in which the aid was used. G4 However, Judge Tang noted that the Supreme Court has not consistently applied the primary effects prong of the Lemon u.
Kurtzman test. GG
Judge Tang concluded, however, that even if the majority's
interpretation of the second prong of the Lemon u. Kurtzman
test was correct, providing aid for a sign language interpreter
does not have the primary effect of advancing religion. G6 He argued that the majority misapplied School District of Grand
Rapids u. Ball G7 and Meek v. Pittenger G8 to conclude that providing aid has the principle effect of advancing religion:19
Judge Tang argued that four factors distinguish Ball and
Pittenger from Zobrest.~o First, in Zobrest, general welfare legis51. [d. "The Establishment Clause will tolerate measures that only indirectly impact upon religion." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 771 (1973). "Not every law that confers an indirect, remote, or incidental benefit
, upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid." [d.
52. "The use of the word primary in the [Lemon v. Kurtzman] test connotates a
survey of the legislation's total operation, rather than its particular application in the
pending case." Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199.
53. [d. at 1198; see also Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servo for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 487-88 and 492. In Witters a blind student was pursuing a program of religious
studies at a Christian college. [d. He applied for Washington's vocational rehabilitation
assistance. [d. The Supreme court in Witters held that the second prong of the Lemon U.
Kurtzman test (primary effect) did not forbid the aid. [d.
54. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1198; see also Mueller V. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397. In Mueller the court looked at the broad class of beneficiaries of a tax exemption, including all
parents of school aged children, whether their child was enrolled in public or private
schools, and concluded that "[t]he provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum ... is an
important index of secular effect." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397.
55. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199; see also Hunt V. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (In Hunt
the Supreme Court did not consider the general operation of a governmental program
rather it looked to a particular application in assessing primary effect).
56. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199.
57. School Dist. of Grand Rapids V. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). In Ball teachers paid
by the state taught secular classes in private schools which lowered the private schools'
costs. Ball, 473 U.S. at 395-97.
58. Meek V. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). In Pittenger the state provided instructional materials and equipment to the religious school which lowered their educational
costs for their students. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 365-66.
59. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199.
60. [d.
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lation is involved, whereas in Pittenger and Ball the legislation
was directed solely at private schools. 61 General welfare programs that are available to all children, whether in public or private schools, are not unconstitutional because they benefit the
entire population. 62 Therefore, cases involving aid directed to religious institutions should not be controlling in Zobrest. 63
Seco~d, the legislation in Pittenger and Ball, involved aid
that compensated religious schools for the educational costs of
their students. 64 Those legislative schemes are distinguishable
from the legislation in Zobrest, which would not have the funds
go to Salpointe but rather to the interpreter. 611 The legislation
would not relieve Salpointe of any financial or educational
burdens. 66

Third, the legislation in Pittenger and Ball gave religious
schools direct educational assistance. 67 In Zobrest, Salpointe
does not directly benefit as a result of the EHA.68 The EHA
benefits are implemented at a sectarian school not because of
any legislation, but because Zobrest elected to enroll at a secta- .
rian school. 69
61. Id.

62. Id. The Supreme Court considers who the primary beneficiaries of legislation are
when it determines whether a statute's primary effect is to benefit religion. In general,
religious schools are not the primary beneficiaries of welfare legislation. Rather they are
incidental beneficiaries of the legislation. "[Pjrograms targeted exclusively at religious
entities are probably unconstitutional." Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I, 10-11
(1989).
63. Bullock, 489 U.S. at 10-11.
64. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1200.
65. Id. James' interpreter is not employed or paid by Salpointe but is paid and em.
ployed by the public school district. Id.
66. Id. Salpointe would not employ or pay a sign language interpreter without state
aid. Id. Either the Zobrests would have to payor James would be without an interpreter
while enrolled at Salpointe. Id. In fact, the Zobrests hired an interpreter while awaiting
the outcome of this case. Id.
67.Id.
68.Id.
69. Id. Salpointe benefits from the EHA only as a consequence of James decision to
attend that school. Id. The historic purposes of the establishment clause simply do not
encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private
choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available ... benefit at issue in this case. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400. Tang
noted that the Supreme Court in Witters determined that it was significant to note that
religious schools received benefits "only as a result of the genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients" to attend a religious educational institution. Witters v.
Washington Dept. of Servo for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487. "The pupil not the state
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Judge Tang concluded that under the EHA and the Arizona
legislation, the state and sectarian schools could not dictate
whether a sectarian school would benefit financially.70 In this
case, unlike the schools in Ball and Pittenger, Salpointe never
saw the funds, because the sign language interpreter was an employee of the state's local school district. 71 Only Zobrest and his
parents benefitted from the funds.72
Fourth, in Ball there was a symbolic union of church and
state through the legislation's benefits. Here, paying a sign language interpreter does not establish a symbolic union. 7S An impermissible union of church and state is not necessarily created
when state funds are used to convey both secular and sectarian
ideas.74 The teachers in parochial schools are the source of religious doctrine, not the interpreter.7&
Judge Tang determined that the First Amendment does not
contain an absolute prohibition against the placement of state
employees in religious schools. 7/! As a result he concluded that
the majority placed undue emphasis on the fact that a state
funded interpreter would perform services in a sectarian classroom. 77 First Amendment rights are contingent upon the substantive nature and quality of the aid provided, not to whom the
money is paid. 78
determined whether a religious institution would receive any of the available funds."
Zobrest 963 F.2d at 1201.
70. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1201.
71. [d.
72. [d. The Zobrests would no longer have to pay for the interpreter at their expense. [d.
73. [d.
74. [d. The state is simply funding education for handicapped students in a general
and nondiscriminatory manner. [d.
75. [d. "The role played by the interpreter is narrow, isolated, and unique". [d.
76. [d.; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977) (Health technicians
may be provided by the state to parochial schools.); Board of Education of Central Sch.
Dist. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (Textbooks may be provided by the state to parochial
school students.). Tang noted that in Witters sectarian school teachers' salaries were
contributed to from state funds that were used to pay for sectarian student's tuition. The
funds went directly from the state to the student, then through the student to the sectarian school. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1201.
77. [d.
78. [d. "But First Amendment rights should not depend on how circuitous a money
trail the government constructs." [d. "Functional analysis, not formalistic line-drawing,
must be undertaken." [d.
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In addition, Judge Tang reasoned that sign language interpreters are technical assistants of communication 79 that perform
the mechanical service of changing words from one language to
another.80 He .observed that sign language interpreters are "not
potential founts of religious doctrine" li.ke teachers.81 A sign language interpreter is like eye glasses or a hearing aid that conveys
communication and is not an independent source of the ideas
communicated.82 Judge Tang concluded that the distinction between the funding of a sign language interpreter and a hearing
aid is immaterial. 83
The symbolic union theory is further undercut in this dissent, because the interpreter would only be involved with one
student, thus ensuring that the public would not be confused by
where the state service ends and the religion begins. 8• In addition, the interpreter is placed in the classroom by the parents'
decision, not the state's action. 8Ci
Judge Tang determined that "[r]ather than suggest an im- .
permissible connection between church and state, the provision
of an interpreter would simply demonstrate to the public the
government's desire to equalize the educational opportunities of
all its students and to help handicapped students overcome barriers to their full academic development."88 For the above reasons, Judge Tang concluded that funding from the EHA for a
sign language interpreter did not have the primary effect of advancing religion. 87
79. [d. at 1202. Hearing aids and eyeglasses are used as modes of communication.
[d. "[T)hese products, like an interpreter make it possible for a [handicapped) ... student to receive and decipher religious messages." [d. "[J)ames Zobrest requires human
rather than purely mechanical assistance in the classroom." [d.
80. [d. at 1201-02. "An interpreter neither adds to nor detracts from the message
she conveys, nor does she interject personal views and philosophies into the translation."
[d.
81. [d.
82. [d.
83. [d. The majority did not appear to determine that the first amendment would
be offended by state funding for eye glasses or hearing aids for sectarian students. [d.
84. [d. The other students education will not be involved with the interpreter. [d.
85. [d. at 1202.
86. [d. "Such aid is religion-blind." [d.
87. [d.
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Although, the majority did not rule on the third prong of
the Lemon v. Kurtzman test,88 Judge Tang addressed the issue
of excessive government entanglement with religion. 89 He concluded that the legislation does not promote excessive government entanglement,90 noting that when funds are provided to a
student, it is necessary to determine whether the resulting relationship between church and state violates the Establishment
Clause. 91 Judge Tang emphasized that the mere existence of an
interrelationship between the school district, as a state agency
and, Salpointe, a sectarian school, does not necessarily violate
the First Amendment. 92 The First Amendment, he reasoned, is
violated only when the interrelationship is excessive. 9s
Moreover, he observed that two questions must be resolved
when conducting an analysis of the third prong of the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test. 94 The first question is whether the government
would have to unconstitutionally intrude into Salpointe's religious activity in order to supervise the interpreter's job performance. 911 The second question addresses the nature of the sign language interpreter's job, and whether it impermissibly involved a
state employee in religious matters.96
First, both the Zobrests and the state recognized that state
officials would have to supervise the interpreter.97 Judge Tang
determined that this type of supervision does not create levels of
state and church involvement that violate the Constitution. He
explained that the Constitution tolerates limited supervision between sectarian schools and state officials. 98
88. [d. at 1196.
89. [d. at 1203.
90. [d.
91. [d.
92. [d.

93. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1203.
94. [d.

95. [d.
96. [d. at 1203-04.

97. Zob~est, 963 F.2d at 1203. There would be periodic evaluations of the interpreter's quality of work. [d.
98. [d.; see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (The establishment clause
was not. violated when state diagnostic health services were given to sectarian school
students because there was limited contact between state officials, religious teachers, and
students.); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983) (A tax deduction for the expense of
textbooks was upheld for parents of students in sectarian schools, despite the state having to determine whether the textbooks promoted religion.).
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No additional supervision would be necessary simply because the interpreter worked at a sectarian' schoo1. 99 Furthermore, the evaluations of the interpreter's work would not involve
state officials in religious matters.100 Judge Tang concluded that
such routine supervision was "sufficiently contained and abbreviated to prevent excessive entanglement."lol
Second, there must also be an inquiry into the nature of the
sign language interpreter's job. l02 Judge Tang concluded that the
nature of the interpreter's job did not entail excessive entanglement between church and state. 103
A sign language interpreter, in contrast to teachers or therapists, does not have opportunities to foster or transmit personal
sectarian ideas. lo, Like the eye glasses or hearing aid the interpreter would neutrally translate the message from the teacher
into a form Zobrest could comprehend. l06 Therefore, funding of
a sign language interpreter does not violate the Establishment
Clause. l08
2.

The Free Exercise Clause

Judge Tang did agree with the majority that denying
Zobrest a sign language interpreter unconstitutionally burdened
99. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1203·04. Since the supervision would be limited to the in·
terpreter's job performance it would not involve "comprehensive, discriminatory, and
continuing state surveillance" which is precluded by the third prong of the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test. Id.
100. Id. at 1204. "[T]he supervision of [the] interpreter will not implicate religious
concerns to the same extent as other Establishment Clause cases have." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court noted:
The parties stipulated that ... the interpreter's code of ethics
obliges her to translate communications completely, without
altering, editing, or revising in any manner the content of the
message. [The parties also concede] that at times the inter·
preter will be unable to affect a literal translation of a commu·
nication, including religious messages. In .such circumstances,
the interpreter must use her own judgment and, to the best of
her ability, convey the message as accurately as possible.
Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1204·05.
105. Id. at 1205.
106. Id. "[T]he interpreter's role remains confined to a technical search for words
and signs that closely approximate each other." Id.
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his free exercise of religion. lo7 Yet, Judge Tang differed from the
majority by concluding that funding for a sign language interpreter would not violate the Establishment Clause. He therefore,
reasoned that the state does not have a compelling interest to
justify withholding funds. lOS
Ultimately, Judge Tang concluded that state funding for a
sign language interpreter for a student enrolled in a sectarian
school is a general welfare benefit.loe This benefit is distributed
equally to all qualified students and is not an impermissible establishment of religion yo Moreover, the Free Exercise Clause is
violated only when students in sectarian schools are excluded
from a general welfare benefit.lll Thus, the Free Exercise Clause
would be violated if Zobrest could not receive a state funded
interpreter.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,112 the
Ninth Circuit held that neither the Establishment Clause nor
the Free Exercise Clause was violated by the refusal to provide a
state funded sign language interpreter to a deaf student enrolled
in a sectarian school. However, in a strong dissent, Judge Tang
argued that the Establishment Clause would not be violated by
the provision for a state paid interpreter, U3 and in turn, the Free
Exercise Clause would be violated by the denial of such an
interpreter. u ,
If the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit's opinion in

this case, there will be little or no change in the manner in which
state funds are distributed to handicapped students enrolled in
lO7. Id.
108. Id.; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 ("[TJhe State interest ... in achieving
greater separation of Church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment
Clause ... is limited by the Free Exercise Clause".).
109. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1206. Funding for a sign language interpreter is "cautiously delineated secular governmental assistance." Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
113. Id. at 1197.
114. Id. at 1204.
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sectarian schools. If, however, the Supreme Court vacates the
Ninth Circuit's opinion; there will be profound changes in this
and similar First Amendment issues. Specifically, a change in
the manner special education and integrated programs are furnished to handicapped students enrolled in sectarian schools will
result.
If the Supreme Court mandates funding for a sign language
interpreter for Zobrest, the wall traditionally erected between
church and state will begin to erode. It may be the beginning of
the wall crumbling down.
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